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The literature on transition distinguishes between two groups of transition countries: the seven 
South East European countries (SEEC-7) and the eight Central East European countries 
(CEEC-8). The former group is generally less developed, receives less FDI, and is more 
backward in terms of transformation than the CEECs, which also became the EU members 
and in the literature they are known as New Member States (NMS). However, fifteen years of 
transition have brought about tremendous changes, driven by broad economic reform 
programs, including changes in fiscal and monetary policy, widespread privatization, price 
and trade liberalization, and new regulatory approaches in these countries. But, if the number 
of people in the SEECs is only twenty per cent lower than in the CEECs, the overall GDP of 
the former group is one third of the latter's. Analysis of the real sector shows that the macro-
stabilization program approved by the International Monetary Fund (has aimed at decreasing 
inflation and unemployment, and equalizing the balance of payments) has brought good 
results in the CEE group of countries, but not in the SEE group. In this paper, we analyze the 
reason why the SEE region has been delaying in the transition process and try to find a 
general path for successful transformation based on the experience of the CEE-8. In 
particular, in this paper, the role of the small and medium enterprises as an engine of 
transition has been researched in some transition countries; and this paper determines whether 
foreign investors helped in building this sector and to what extent.  
JEL Classification: P20; P52 
Key words: the transition process, the SEE region, the private sector, small and medium 
enterprises 
  11.  Introduction 
 
With the collapse of socialism, all ex centrally-planned economies started their path toward 
building a market economy and their final results depended on their starting positions, as well 
as their internal and external factors. The long and dissimilar transition processes which they 
either passed through or are in now divided all transition countries into three groups: Central 
East European countries (CEEC), the South East European countries (SEEC), and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  The former became EU members in 2004, 
known in the literature as New Member States (NMS), and it can be said that they have 
finished their transition process, while the other two groups are lagging more behind the NMS 
in terms of the speed and success of transition.  
 
The SEE region suffers a low level of the GDP, three times less than today’s NMS, extreme 
unemployment in some of their states, a huge current account deficit, and external debt. 
Because the transition is a very complex process of complete transformation of the economic 
and political systems, it includes liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, 
and legal and institutional reforms. Therefore, the SEE region has more or less successfully 
finished its first and second phase, while the privatization is still in process; in this paper, we 
put focus on the development of the private sector. The private sector based on private 
property is crucial for a successful transition, and the development of the private sector can be 
done through the privatization of socialist state-owned companies or by opening a new 
company. According to the CEECs’ experience, foreign investors might have a crucial 
influence in the privatization, but their roles in running business can vary between transition 
countries.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: after the introduction, section 1 provides a general overview of 
the transition process and introduces the main performance of transition countries, dividing them 
into two groups, CEEC,c which are today’s European members, and the SEE region. Section 3 
researches the meaning of the private sector in some transition countries, and the impact of the 
small and medium enterprises on successful transformation.  According to the obtained results 
section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  Transition and the results of the transition process  in the CEE and SEE regions 
 
  2Transition as a process of political and economic transformation of an economic system 
depends on a country’s initial position but generally, the socialist system was politically, 
economically, and socially unsustainable. After its collapse total reformation was needed. For 
building an open - on market rules setup economy - it is necessary that the transition process 
includes four main parallel activities: 
•  Liberalization: opening of the market - free markets determination of prices of all 
goods and services and reduction of trade barriers;  
•  Macroeconomic stabilization: achievement of a stable economic system - the process 
through which inflation is brought under control and lowered over time, after the 
initial burst of high inflation that follows from liberalization in many transition 
economies;  
•  Restructuring and privatization: the process of privatization of the state-owned 
companies and creation of a sound real and financial sector;  
•  Legal and institutional reforms: building the institutional infrastructure - these are 
needed to redefine the role of the state in these economies, establish the rule of law, 
and introduce appropriate competition policies.  
With the first process, liberalization of price and trade, in almost all transition countries 
inflation burst. Early in the transition, inflation averaged 450  percent a year in the CEE, 
nearly 900 percent in the Baltic States, and over 1000 percent in the CIS, while for the entire 
SEE region the data for mentioned period are not available. By  1998, however, annual 
inflation had been lowered to the single digits in the first two groups and around 30 percent in 
the third (IMF, 2000). Along with the high inflation rate, the transition countries needed to 
cope with one more shock, the decline of production and this reduction was different between 
transition countries. Therefore, the decline in output as well as economic growth in the 
CEECs during the 1990s was the reflection of the national readiness, policy strengths and 
weaknesses as well as external influences.  
The transition process is the process of change of the economic system and transformation 
from centrally-planned to a free market system based on private property and, by definition, it 
is a process of introducing the principles and elements of the market into former communist 
economies. This process represented challenges for all socialist countries and their 
experiences were different. All transition countries chose between two strategies: the "big 
bang" approach that means a fast and comprehensive implementation of all major reforms or a 
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countries tightly follow the advice of the international institutions like the International 
Monetary Fond or the World Bank, while some others try to develop their own strategies and 
find their own way by accepting national weaknesses and strengths as well as environmental 
influences. Generally, the latter has given better results than the former model. 
While all of the transition economies experienced a fall in production at the start of the 
transition process, some countries in Central and East Europe recovered growth after a few 
years. The results of other countries were showing little or no recovery of growth through 
most of the 1990s. In order to confirm this statement we present the data about the GDP in 
table 1. While the negative growth rate of the GDP was a rule for the SEECs during the 
1990s, it had been an exception for the CEECs. Namely, the latter set on the positive trend in 
the second part of the 1990s, so their average growth rate for the decade was mostly positive; 
the exceptions were Latvia and Lithuania. In the second analyzed period, 2000-2004, all 
countries from both groups revealed positive growth rate of the GDP, and the SEECs recorded 
the faster economic growth than CEEC, but their starting position was very different. So, the 
faster growth of the SEE region in recent years was not enough to reach the development 
level of the CEE-8. Furthermore, we should emphasize that there were some differences 
inside the two analyzed groups, e.g. in the first group, the highest growth rate of the GDP was 
realized by Romania and Albania, higher than 5%, while the lowest rate was accomplished by 
FYR Macedonia, less than 1%, other countries from the region reached nearly 5%. In the 
second group, the most successful countries according to this indicator were Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia with a growth rate of 7 or more percent, followed by Slovakia and 
Hungary; while other states generated nearly 3% of the GDP per year (table 1).  
 
  4Table 1. The growth rate of the GDP and selected economic activities for the SEECs and the 
CEECs, 1990 - 2004 
 





















Albania 3.5  5.4  4.3 5.1 -0.5 4.8 N.A N.A.  7.0 7.7
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
NA 4.9  N.A. 0 N.A. 3.2 N.A. 4.1  - 5.0
Bulgaria -1.8  4.8  3.0 1.8 -5.0 5.3 N.A. 8.2  -5.2 4.9
Croatia 0.6  4.5  -3.0 0.2 -2.5 5.5 -3.3 3.5  2.2 5.2
FRY 
Macedonia 
-0.8 0.7 0.2 -0.6 -2.9 0.4 -5.4 -1.3 1.0 1.3
Romania -0.6  5.9  -1.9 8.9 1.2 5.9 N.A N.A.  0.9 5.6
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
1.5 4.7  N.A 5.5 1.2 N.A N.A N.A  N.A 7.2
CEEC-8 
Czech Rep.  1.1  2.8  2.4 1.2 -0.2 4.1 3.8 6.0  1.7 2.0
Estonia 0.2  7.0  -3.4 -2.0 -3.3 10.5 5.9 11.6  3.1 5.9
Hungary 1.6  4.0  -2.4 5.5 3.5 3.3 7.9 4.5  1.2 3.9
Latvia -1.6  7.0  -5.7 2.7 -8.7 8.6 -7.8 8.1  2.6 7.9
Lithuania -2.7  7.5  -0.8 2.7 3.3 10.5 5.7 9.6  5.5 6.4
Poland 4.6  2.8  8.0 3.0 5.0 3.3 N.A. 20  42 64
Slovenia 2.7  3.2  -0.5 -1.2 1.6 3.9 1.4 4.7  3.2 3.3
Slovakia 1.9  4.6  2.7 3.6 2.4 5.2 6.6 5.7  5.7 4.4
Source: WB (2006)  
 
If we research the development process of the GDP by economic activity, the data in table 1 
reveal that the agriculture in all transition countries passed through a really hard period, and 
this sector has probably not yet recovered in some countries like Estonia, Slovenia, and 
Macedonia where the growth rates were also negative in the second analyzed period. 
Agriculture in ex-socialist countries was characterized by a considerable share of small-scale 
farming, and these households often consume a significant proportion of their own 
production. The reforms and transition to the market in the agriculture sector set out in 
destroying agriculture production, and its meaning in national production has been sharply 
decreasing. Amongst the SEEC-7, in Albania, for example agriculture had a high weight in 
the total economic activities but it decreased during the transition process from 36% to 25%. 
The same trends were carried out in the other SEECs but agriculture remained with a share 
more than 10% in their total national productions, while in the CEECs the agriculture 
participated with only 3 or 4% in total economic activity. According to the presented data, we 
can conclude that the transition brought the same trends in both groups of countries, but in the 
CEEC-8, the value and the size of the progress have been weighty. 
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industrial development expressed in policies of "forced growth" (Kornai, 1980, 1992) but in 
regard to the statistical data during the reforming process that notion is changed. Industry lost 
its primary position. In fact, the industry’s share was nearly 50% in total national activities at 
the beginning of the 1990s, and it decreased to 30% or less. Therefore, industry sector with an 
average share of 30% in both groups of countries reached the second position and the service 
sector took over the primacy. With regard to the statistical data of the World Bank (WB, 
2006) the sharpest decline of the industry sector was recorded by Albania from 48 to 19% in 
the first group, and Latvia (from 46 to 23%) and Estonia (from 50 to 29%) from the second 
group. We can conclude that, during the transition process, services became the main 
economic sector in all transition countries, participating with more than 60% in the CEEC-8 
and between 45 and 62% in the SEEC-7, what is also the a main characteristic of developed 
countries. If we only compare the structure of the economy in 2004 (the static approach) the 
SEEC-7 have conducted equally successful transition processes as the CEEC-8, but with a 
deeper investigation that statement should be refuted. 
 
With regard to the statistical data and the development achievement, a general assessment of 
the transition process, however, allows us to put the SEEC into the category of less successful 
transition countries but with better results than some Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), like Azerbaijan, Belarus, or Tajikistan. Furthermore, a major problem for all transition 
countries was the initial recession that set them back relative to the developed countries. 
Besides different initial economic and development positions, obvious between and inside the  
two groups of countries, the transition process has been delayed and complicated or has not 
given the expected results due to war, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, and more recently, Macedonia. So, if all the transition countries started with 
the same initial economic position, they did not have the same environmental conditions; 
thereby equal results cannot be achieved. 
 
Therefore, the presented data in figure 1 are reasonable. In 1990, the average GDP per capita 
in the SEECs was 1,600 US $ and in 2004 it increased to 3,500 US $, while that increment in 
the CEE region was more than tripled from 2,500 US $ to 7,800 US $
1.  The highest 
development level measured through the GDP per capita was achieved by Slovenia (16,091 
                                                 
1 Own calculation on the basis of the World Bank data (WB, 2006). 
  6US $), followed by the Czech Republic (10,491 US $) and Hungary (9,970 US $). On the 
opposite side are the SEEC-7 which hardly crossed 2,000 US $ per capita in 2004, and the 
exception in that group is Croatia with 8,000 US $ per capita, more than Lithuania, Latvia, 
Poland, and Slovakia from the other group. 
 





























Source: Own calculation based on the data of the World Bank (WB, 2006) 
 
 
Not only is the difference in the development level between the two groups a problem, but the 
contrast is also obvious with respect to foreign relations.  Because each group has only one 
extreme, it is hard to make a general assessment. The SEEC-7 as a group suffered from a huge 
trade and current account deficit, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the current 
account deficit made up 22.5% of its GDP in 2004. For Serbia and Montenegro, the data are 
not available, while for other countries of the SEE region, the share of the current account 
deficit in the total GDP was between 4.8% (Croatia) and 7.8% (Macedonia) for the year 2004. 
According to latest trends, with respect to the current account deficit, the SEECs have not run 
deficits more than the CEE countries. In fact, amongst the CEE-8, there are two different 
groups: Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with a huge current account deficit and 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic with a current account deficit 
equal or less than 5% of their GDP for the year 2004 (figure 2). 




























Source: own calculation based on the data of the World Bank (WB, 2006) 
 
Generally, we can conclude that all countries that initially liberalized their external trade 
aggravated their external position by accumulating a huge current account deficit and external 
debt. Because the FDI inflows are non-debt-creating, they are a preferred method of financing 
current account deficits. It is self-explanatory why transition countries try to attract the largest 
possible amount of the FDI through a friendly macroeconomic framework, and they 
sometimes maintain “real battle” with other developing countries. 
 
Besides a high trade imbalance and a huge current account deficit, some of the transition 
countries have a problem with an external debt. The total amount of external debt in the SEE 
region was 100 billion US $ in 2004; meanwhile the CEEC-8 debited nearly 270 billion US $. 
In terms of per capita, every resident of Central and East Europe is indebted nearly 3,600 US 
$ and resident of the SEE region 2,000 US $. As the data in figure 3 show, the situation with 
regard to external debt is not equal in all countries. Inside the SEE region, the most indebted 
country was Croatia, with 7,300 US $ per capita (value of debt in 2004), and the least 
indebted country was Albania with only 500 US $; while other countries from the region 
averaged debt of between 1,000 and 2,000 US $. In light of Croatia’s good development 
results in the SEE region, we cannot only assessment its high debt ratio negatively because 
the CEECs also financed their development with external funds. As figure 3 shows, the 
CEECs are also relatively indebted nations; they have owed between 40% (Poland) and 70% 
(Latvia) of their annual national production. The exception is Estonia with a share of external 
debt in the GDP of 90%, similar to Croatia. But the main problem, arising from insolvency is 
how each country used money on loan. The higher proportion of borrowed money used for 
  8opening new activities and firms, particularly productive capacities, the better the 
development results will be. Although, there are differences in the level of indebtedness, there 
are also huge differences in the usage of that money. To assess the success in resolving this 
economic problem, it is necessary to analyze the national possibilities of each country in 
returning borrowed money. Nevertheless, management of the large external imbalances 
should yet pose a serious macroeconomic challenge for many countries in both groups. 
 






























Source: own calculation on the basis of the data of the World Bank (WB, 2006) 
 
 
Unemployment is also a problem in SEECs, but not to the same degree in all countries.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina had the highest unemployment rate of nearly 40%, followed by 
Serbia and Montenegro with 34%, and Macedonia with 32%. In spite of huge unemployment 
in the SEE region, Albania, Bulgaria, and Croatia were faced with an unemployment rate 
below 18%. In Romania, the most populated SEE country, the unemployment rate is 
relatively low, nearly 8%, while the CEE region has relatively managed its unemployment 
problem;  Slovenia’s unemployment rate was about 6%, but in Poland it was much higher, at 
about 18% in 2002 (Škuflić, Štoković, 2006). 
 
 
3. The role of the private sector in the transition process 
 
The socialist economic system based on government management of production and 
consumption developed an economic structure that could not survive on the market principles. 
In socialist conditions with regulated prices, many businesses earn losses; a lot of them were 
  9inefficient and many of them hired more people than they needed; thereby their productivity 
was very low. Along the initial liberalization of prices and trade, imports in transition 
countries burst because everything was cheaper from abroad, and businesses started their 
reconstruction process during which many of them became insolvent and went bankrupt. The 
faster a country liberalized its trade, the faster its current account deficit exploded. In some 
countries, there were only a few businesses that could cope with the competition from abroad. 
Therefore, reconstruction of firms and structural reforms were crucial for a successful 
transition process; where structural reforms were put in place early and firmly, new 
production networks developed quickly and encouraged a swift recovery. At the beginning of 
the transition process, many ex-socialist countries had inadequate economic structure with a 
large proportion of heavy and military industries for which, when the Berlin Wall fell, the 
market disappeared.  
 
Therefore, after the initial phase of strong progress in liberalization, privatization, and the 
establishment of macroeconomic stability, all transition countries, to a great extent, 
completed; the second phase that covers the building of a sound private sector, institutions, 
policies and practices, all countries did not put successfully through. We should stress that the 
building of the private sector depends on the quality of the privatization process to some 
extent, but it depends even more on the quality of infrastructure and institutions in these 
countries.  Because a market economy is built on the private property and private sector, the 
privatization of state companies can reverse or amplify expected results. For example, 
Hungary followed a gradualist approach to privatization, and it appears to have proved more 
conducive to genuine restructuring of enterprises, and, on the opposite, the experiences of the 
Czech Republic and Russia have shown some of the pitfalls of the rapid privatization 
approach (IMF, 2000). But, as Stiglitz (1999) has argued, the following steps are necessary 
for successful transition: (1) the mass emergence of successful small- and medium-scale 
family enterprises; (2) the privatization of large enterprises in a transparent competitive 
process with many bidders and clear information; and (3) the emergence of a new economic 
system that functions under perfectly competitive conditions.  
 
Not only is the private sector important, but the size and the quality of small and medium 
enterprises is also relevant. The development of small and medium sectors is essential to 
create the political and social environmental conditions necessary to allow desirable changes 
to occur elsewhere in the system (McIntyre, 2001) Therefore, if the privatization has either 
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relationships, no significant and sustained SME growth can be expected. On the other side, 
entrepreneurship is crucial for a successful transition process and for building a market 
economy. With regard to the definition of the entrepreneurs, a person who starts business and 
is ready to take risks, in many cases introduces the new products and services; we once again 
stress the significance and quality of the SME sector as a crucial factor for the transition 
process. Sustained and healthy growth of this sector is obviously necessary, since it is difficult 
to imagine raising overall living standards and social peace without such a development. Not 
only is the development of the SME sector important, but the share of productive small 
enterprises is also relevant because, in many transition countries with the liberalization and 
strong foreign competition, the industry base was completely destroyed. In order to evaluate 
the size of the SME in transition countries, we use the total number of small and medium 
enterprises and their percentage in total employment, which we will present in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Micro, small and medium size enterprise in transition countries, 2000-2004 
Country  
Number 
of firms  
Employment 
% of total 
SMEs per 
1000 people 
Albania 35,694  56.7  11.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  75,000  62.6  19.2 
Bulgaria 224,211  64.7  28.7 
Croatia 96,146  40  22.4 
Macedonia 27,938  N.A  14.0 
Romania 347,064  N.A  16.0 
Serbia and Montenegro  68,220  70.4  8.4 
CEEC-8 
Czech R.  2,350,584 62.2  230.5 
Estonia 32,801  55  25.2 
Hungary 855,058  55.8  84.7 
Latvia 32,571  36.6  14.1 
Lithuania 55,825  70.6  16.4 
Poland 1,654,822  68  43.3 
Slovak R.  93,392  64.1  17.3 
Slovenia 70,553  66  35.3 
Source: WB, 2006 and own calculation based on the World Bank data 
 
Attending with the data in table 2, amongst the CEE-8, Lithuania (70.6%) realized the highest 
share of employment in small and medium enterprises, followed by Poland (68%), Slovenia 
(66%), and the Slovak Republic (64.1%). Latvia (36.6%) and Estonia (55%) noticed the 
lowest level of the SME in total employment. In the SEE region, Croatia hired the least part of 
total workers in small and medium enterprise (40%) while Serbia and Montenegro performed 
the highest share. Although some of this data are unexpected, like a high portion of 
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could be connected with the other before-presented data. For example, Croatia based its 
development process on external debt, and accumulated a relatively high amount of it, but 
simultaneously this country did not envelop its production base and especially did not build 
up its small and medium enterprise entity. The next, graver Croatian fallacy is that it has not 
developed a productive small and medium enterprise base, because, in that share of 40%, 
many enterprises are located in the service sector. In fact, at the beginning of the transition 
process, when many people lost their jobs, some of them opened their own businesses and, 
because they did not have initial capital, they started to deal with activity for which it is not 
necessary to invest greatly. Therefore, without its own strong production base, capable of 
coping with foreign competition, Croatia must import a lot of goods, and, however, that 
increases its high trade deficit. An opposite example is Slovenia, a country in which people in 
first year of transition replaced job losses with the opening of new companies, so today’s 
SME employment is nearly 70%, the current account deficit and the external debt is not very 
high, but its development results are very impressive.  
 
The level of the SME sector in a national economy is also important due to its influence on 
the labor market. However, the SME sector can simultaneously absorb resources and workers 
from the large enterprise sector which underwent a heavy transformation during the first 
transition years and, at the same time, it can help to create a labor market situation in which 
the process of reorientation and fundamental reorganization of the large enterprise sector can 
be carried through without threatening social peace (McIntyre, 2001). Therefore, it is easy to 
understand why Croatia has to struggle with a relatively high unemployment rate, according 
to the before-presented data, but it is hard to explain why the unemployment rate is so high in 
Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the SME employ nearly 70% of 
total employed. Additionally, it is necessary to stress one more important fact for interpreting 
the presented data. The data in table 2 show only the share of small and medium companies in 
total employment but they do not tell us anything about the employment level and overall 
economic activities. We conclude that, according to the before-reviewed data, Serbia and 
Bosnia have a very low level of employment and economic activities; thereby even with a 
high share of the SME sector it is not enough for starting the serious development process, 
and this is the reason why those countries realized the worst economic results during the 
transition process.  
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conclusion it is necessary to conduct more additional research. For this reason, to make the 
data more comparable, we calculate the number of small and medium enterprises per capita 
(table 2). With respect to the number of SME per 1,000 inhabitants, the previous hypothesis 
about Serbia and Montenegro has been proven.  This country during 2000-2004 ran only 8.5 
small and medium companies per 1,000 inhabitants while Croatia noted almost four times 
more enterprise activities, and the unemployment rate in the latter is lower than in the former. 
Although, Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed nearly 20 companies per 1,000 residents, its 
economic activity is still too low to employ a huge number of unemployed people, which 
brought that country an unemployment rate of about 40%. Bulgaria obtained the best results 
from the SEE region with nearly 29 small and medium companies per 1,000 inhabitants. The 
range of that indicator is much higher in the CEE region than in the SEE region; the Czech 
Republic with 230. 5 companies is on one side, and Latvia with only 14.1 on the other. Due to 
the very wide range of that indicator inside CEE-8, we can firmly draw a tie between the SME 
sector, development results and transition success.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Croatia, countries with a better performance in the SME sector, are positioned a relatively 
high on the list of successful states in their own group.  
 
At the current level of analysis, we can ask a very obvious question: why did some countries 
have better success while others obtained less desirable results in building the private sector, 
as well as small and medium enterprises due to very large range of differences? Namely, the 
size of the SME sector depends on a “set of fundamental political, social, and legal ground 
rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange, and distribution” (Davis, North, 
1971). Fundamental rules such as private property rights are a major influence on the nature 
and extent of any entrepreneurial activity, whilst day-to-day economic and political decisions, 
as well as unwritten rules, determine the actual scope for the behavior of entrepreneurs and 
their actions. As the small and medium enterprises depend on a range of factors, it is 
impossible to find out the reasons for the before-mentioned differences; and we leave that for 
further research.  Also, but not less important, the role of the foreign direct investors can be 
crucial in developing the SME sector. According to the statistical data, Poland, Hungary and 
Czech Republic from the CEE region received the higher amount of the FDI, while Romania 
and Croatia attracted the most FDI from SEE region (www.unctad.org). During the first year 
of the transition, the FDI inflows were closely associated with the privatization process, but in 
recent years, many FDI inflows were realized through Greenfield investments (Botrić and 
  13Škuflić, 2006). Because the consistent data on privatization-related FDI are not available for 
all countries, Demekas, and others (2005) used the value of cross-border mergers and 
acquisition as the approximating variable for privatization-related FDI inflows. According to 
the mentioned source, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania received an unusually high portion in 
account to non- privatization related FDI, but they are not countries with best performance in 
developing SME sector, assessed through number of SME per 1,000 inhabitants. Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic (countries which FDI stock in 2003 was the highest) also 
noticed the significant share of non privatization-related FDI, but less than the before 
mentioned states, and their results in developing SME sector are very impressive as well as 
the best between all analyzed transition countries. Romania and Croatia from the SEE region 
received the almost triple the amount of non-privatization related FDI than privatization-
related FDI; this is also true for Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but their total FDI 
stock in 2003 was negligible, and their SME performances are also very different. At this 
level of research, we can conclude that foreign investors help in developing small and 
medium enterprises in some transition countries, but not in all cases. If the country received a 
large amount of non-privatization related FDI, it does not automatically mean that it will burst 
enterprise activities. So, the enterprise activity as well as transition and economic 
development are complex categories depend on many factors. We emphasize that, due to the 
unavailability of the more detailed data, our results are only indicative, and should be taken 




Economic transition can be defined as a process of an economic and political transformation 
but also as a process of dramatic institutional changes. The institutions and operating 
mechanisms of the centrally-planned economy were so different from those of the market 
economy, that the transformation from the former into the latter economic system requires 
deep behavioral change (Kornai, 1992). The dangers of market liberalization in the absence of 
strong institutions are now being recognized according to the often unsuccessful stories from 
some transition countries. A strong infrastructure and institutions are necessary and desirable 
factors for foreign investors. As foreign investors bring new technology, know-how, and 
essential capital for investment as well as open new markets, it is easy to understand why it is 
an advisable macroeconomic policy for development. Therefore, after the initial reform of 
liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization, which almost all transition countries resolved 
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building of the private sector, the role of the FDI might be very significant, but not necessary. 
 
Along with a collapse in output, many countries also experienced outbreaks of hyperinflation 
for at least short periods of time. Countries that quickly tamed inflation and sustained gains 
experienced a speedier and stronger recovery in output (IMF, 2000).  The differences in the 
depth of reforms are increasingly the result of policy choices rather than the initial conditions 
because, as the obtained results reveal, differences are maintained inside the groups. As we 
analyzed in this paper, transition has brought about significant structural changes, with some 
sectors contracting (agriculture industry in all countries) and others expanding (services in  
both regions) in terms of shares of total activities. Besides a relatively equalized economic 
structure, there is very a different development level amongst the two analyzed groups, the 
CEE-8 and the SEE-7, but also inside them. According to our research, we only confirm that 
the CEE-8 are more successful than SEE-7, this region lags behind in terms of development 
and employment level as well as the FDI inflows, but not significantly in employment in the 
SME sector. 
 
Thereby, the development of an efficient private sector and entrepreneurship is of critical 
importance to support the economic transition process; we try to find the tie between the level 
of the SME sector and the transition process. After the collapse of socialism, when many 
companies became insolvent and unsustainable, entrepreneurship evolved into a basic 
requirement for a properly- and functionally-running market economy. Most of the former 
state-owned large industries have faced difficulties in becoming competitive on the global 
markets. 
 
While statistics on start-ups and small business development are scarce and often not directly 
comparable to small business data in developed countries, the available data reveal some 
trends. According to the before-reviewed data, for example, Poland with 38.5 million 
inhabitants has about 1.7 million small businesses, whereas the Czech Republic with a 
population of about 10 million records about 2.3 million enterprises. Overall, the share of the 
economy represented by new and small businesses appears to be lower than in developed 
countries (in Italy it is nearly 80%) but not much lower, which is an indication that important 
structural changes remain to be accomplished. In the mentioned structural reforms, the foreign 
investors could have an important role, but we cannot find a strong tie between the small and 
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should be the task of the government. Additionally, on the experiences of the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, there can be drawn a positive relationship between the SME sector and the 
development results, what is not true for Slovenia and Estonia, countries with good 
development success. According to empirical experience in developing small and medium 
enterprises, it is a multidimensional task that must bring a wide range of public, private, and 
non-governmental actors to work together. But in the short transition history, governments for 
some time did not used to promote new and small business as a priority. But, due to some 
successful stories many governments in transition countries are now considering how to 
reconstitute and improve their support for entrepreneurship. Foreign investors can help, but 
the government cannot expect that they resolve the problem. In our opinion, the government 
which covers a range of ministries, together with regional and local administrations and 
financial institutions, should develop a horizontal approach and horizontal incentives for 
boosting the SME sector. Besides a central government, the role of local government levels is 
crucial in promoting entrepreneurship through local partnerships, development agencies, 
business incubators, and other policy tools. Successful transition countries such as Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic have applied these strategies. Only if a country creates the 
appropriate environment for entrepreneurship will it be able to launch a sustainable process of 
growth and job creation and run a successful development story. 
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